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ARGUMENT 
I. The Respondent Failed to Refute the Appellant's Argument that a Default Judg-
ment Void for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction can be Challenged at Any Time. 
The Appellant (Mr. Lytle) set forth a simple question to the Court - whether a party can 
obtain relief from a default judgment that is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, regard-
less of the passage of time. In its ruling on intermediate appeal, the district court affirmed the 
magistrate court's decision that twenty years ,vas not a ·'reasonable time., to seek relief from a 
default judgment that is void because the relief exceeded that amount sought for in the complaint. 
R. Vol. I. pp. 117-18. On appeal. Mr. Lytle contends that the trial court and the district court 
erred, citing numerous decisions suggesting that the clear majority rule throughout the United 
States (as acknowledged in a lengthy footnote in an Idaho appellate decision) is that any time is a 
"reasonable time" to set aside a judgment that is void for lack of jurisdiction. App. Brief pp. 10-
12. 
In her response. the Respondent (Mrs. Lytle) did not refute Mr. Lytle·s claim that there 
should be no time limitation on challenging void judgments for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. She disregards the holding in Afeyer v. Meyer. 135 Idaho 460. 19 P.3d 774 (Idaho App. 
2001) that: 
In order for a judgment to be void, there must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's 
authority to enter the judgment, either because the court lacks personal jurisdiction or 
because it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter in ihe suit. 
Id. ( emphasis added) Instead, Mrs. Lytle suggests that the court need only have "personal 
jurisdiction" to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. Resp. Brief pp. 5-7. This suggestion ignores 
the authority and arguments submitted by Mr. Lytle regarding judgments that are void due to a 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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App. 1 
Mrs. Lytle relies on Harter v. Management Corp., 117 Idaho 121. 785 P.2d 685 (Idaho 
However, Harter is easily distinguishable from this case. Unlike this case. the 
court determined that the judgment was ''not based on a default order," but rather that 
"the court concluded that the judgment \Vas based upon admissible evidence presented at trial of 
which fthe appellant] had notice. and of which [the appellant] had a full opportunity to appear 
and to contest the claims against him .... The court also determined that it had jurisdiction over 
the parties and the subject matter of the action.'' Id (emphasis added) As such, the court 
concluded that: 
Id 
Because of the trial proceeding, the court in essence concluded that the prohibition in 
IRCP 54( c) - against entering judgment by default different in kind from or exceeding 
the amount prayed for in a demand for judgment - was inapplicable. 
Thus. if anything. the Harter decision provides additional support for Mr. Lytle's 
argument because of its implicit assumption that a default judgment is subject to a challenge for 
voidness based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. whereas a judgment resulting from trial 
after notice is not. 
II. The Respondent's Additional Claims, Facts, and Documents \Vere Not Raised or 
Considered Below, and Are Not the Proper Subject of this Appeal. 
Instead of answering the question presented on appeal by the Appellant, in addition to the 
trying to limit voidness challenges to those where the court lacked personal jurisdiction, Mrs. 
L11le attempts to add several "Additional Issues on Appeal," much of which is based on 
documents that were not in the trial court's file and were not part of the record below. These 
should be disregarded. 
First, the district court rejected all these "Additional Issues on Appeal" that it determined 
actually to be issues, or because they were, in reality, not issues but arguments that did not relate 
to any judgment. R. Vol. I, pp. l 1 l 13. 
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Second. Mrs. Lytle did not file a notice of cross appeal from the district court decision. 
Thus, to the extent that they are actually issues, the lack of a cross appeal from the district court's 
decision bars their consideration. Goodman Oil v. DuroBilt. 147 Idaho 56. 58-59. 205P.3d1192, 
1194-1195 (2009). Thus, because Mrs. Lytle has not timely appealed the district court's 
decision, this Court has no jurisdiction to address Mrs. Lytle's "additional issues'' which should 
therefore be summarily dismissed. Id. 
Third. these '·additional issues .. should be dismissed for all of the same reasons stated by 
the district court as to which Mrs. Lytle failed to cite any authority or allege any error. R. Vol. L 
pp. 11 ]-13. 
These additional issues also present a unique and perplexing problem, that is, that they 
are based upon documents which ,,,ere not in the trial court file, and not part of the Clerk's 
Record on appeal to the district court. Mrs. Lytle first sought to make them part of the record (a) 
nearly fourteen months after the trial court's initial Memorandum Decision and Order, and (b) 
sixth months after the district court's Opinion and Order. 
That these documents were allowed to be made part of the record in the form of an 
Addendum to the Clerk's record is disturbing. First it is troubling that the district court allowed 
the augmentation of the record per its October 10, 2014 ·'Judgment Granting Motion to Augment 
Record." J\1rs Lytle did not file a "'Motion to Augment the Record'' but rather a "Defendants 
(sic) Objection to Record on Appeal." (See June 30, 2014, entry on Court Repository, R. Vol L 
p. 9.) The fact that the district court treated Mrs. Lytle's objection as a "Motion to Augment" 
constitutes a usurpation of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Pursuant to IAR § 30, a party 
wishing to augment the record must.file that motion with the Supreme Court under very specific 
instructions, including accompanying the motion with a "statement setting forth the specific 
grounds for the request and attaching a copy of any document sought to be augmented to the 
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original motion etc ... " Mrs. Lytle did not file such motion in accordance with the explicit 
instructions set forth under the rule. The district court had no jurisdiction to augment the record. 
As such. this Court should simply disregard the '·Addendum" to the Clerk's on AppeaL 
Further, the documents in the Addendum to the Clerk's Record are not documents from 
the court file that was available to the trial court. or the district court on appeal. They were 
certainly not available to Mr. Lytle. They are documents supplied to the Court. apparently from 
Mrs. Lytle's counsel's file, and only made part of the court record at the time of the hearing on 
the objection to the record. Counsel for Mrs. Lytle did not receive a copy of any of these 
documents until the Addendum was prepared and served on him. 
These '·Addendum documents" consist of a number of pleadings, motions. and other 
papers from the initial divorce action in 1992. By the time Mr. Lytle' s Rule 60(b) motion was 
filed, the court's previous record had been microfilmed and the original file was apparently 
destroyed. During one of the hearings preliminary to the ultimate ruling by the trial court granting 
the Motion to Dismiss, questions \Vere raised with regard to what previous pleadings existed and 
were available. The trial court admitted: 
Well. I don't know what you know is in the Court records. I mean, I've got very little in 
the Court record and it's a dummy file, it's old and from microfilm. the original file is 
unavailable. I have no idea if it's been destroyed or not. 
June 26, 2013, Tr. 7 LL. 21-25. 
Mr. Lytle was given no opportunity to review or to ascertain the authenticity of these 
documents. But most disturbing is that these documents were not available to anyone other than 
to 1\frs. Lytle at the time that the trial court issued its initial decision. 
Regardless, the only 1992 pleadings that the trial court and district court considered in 
their respective decisions (which were attached as exhibits to Mr. L1tle's 2012 Motion for Relief 
from Judgment and supporting affidavit) were the "Ans\ver and Counter-Claim·· and the "Decree 
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of Dissolution of Marriage ... R. Vol. L pp. 22-34. Further, the only relevant fact that the trial 
court raised in support of its decision to dismiss Mr. L)1le ·s Motion for Relief from Judgment 
was that: "Twenty years is not a 'reasonable time· \Vithin which to set aside a Default Decree 
under almost any imaginable set of circumstances.'' Mem. Dec. Order. R. Vol L p. 69. 
Mrs. Ly1le has not truly .. augmented" the trial court record on appeal: she has essentially 
introduced new evidence at this appellate level. Such documents should be rejected and not 
considered by this Court on appeal. If they were to be considered, this Court would be improperly 
usurping the trial court's role. 
Again. the only question properly before this Court is whether the trial court and the 
district court erred in applying time limitations to a motion for relief from a judgment that is void 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. in contravention to the majority rule in the Cnited States is 
that there are no time limits for such relief. Iv1rs. Lytle simply has not refuted that claim and the 
trial and district court's decisions should therefore be reversed. 
III. The Respondent is Not Entitled to Her Attorney Fees. 
Mrs. Lytle has not provided any basis, argument or authority to support her claim that 
Mr. Ly1le's appeal is without foundation or to support an award of attorney fees under IC § 12-
121. Her argument to this court is limited to one sentence that includes only passing reference to 
I.R.C.P. 54(e), I.A.R. 41, and Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
In response to Mrs. Ly1le's claim for attorney fees on appeal to the district court, the 
district court held that Mr. Lytle had raised "valid legal arguments,'' that the appeal was therefore 
not frivolous, and that fees were not awardable under Idaho Code § 12-121. R. Vol I, p. 118. She 
has not appealed from that decision to this Court. She has not made any appeal to reason, to 
authority, or argument as to ·why the district court \:vas wrong in its conclusion. Most importantly, 
she has not made any attempt to show why the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, in 
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entering a default judgment, to mvard relief beyond that claimed in her counterclaim, or that the 
resulting default judgment was, to that extent, void. She has also not made any attempt to explain 
why the majority rule as to timeliness of a Rule 60(b )( 4) motion is not already, or should not be. 
the rule in Idaho. 
Accordingly. fees are not awardable to Mrs. Lytle for this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons the district court's decision and the magistrate court·s 
decision should be reversed. and this case should be remanded to the magistrate court \Vith 
instructions that Mr. Lytle· s Rule 60(b)( 4) motion be granted and the requested relief be awarded 
to him. 
DATED this 31'1 day of October, 2014. 
P. - RSE:\' Moss 1-L 
t_ 
Nathan M. Olsen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho. \Vith my office in 
Idaho Falls. Idaho, and that on the 31 day of OctobeL 2014, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b). I.R.C .P. 
Persons Served: 
Reginald R. Reeves, Esq. 
DEN\1AN & REEVES 
P.O. Box 1841 
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83403 
FAX: (208) 522-2516 
iessicamontalvan@vahoo.com 
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